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Marine Insurance Law Reform in Australia – a 
Following Sea 
Professor Julie-Anne Tarr*  
The Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) is perhaps one of the 
outstanding examples in the common-law world of a statute that has 
had major impact upon international commerce and a wide reach 
beyond its maritime focus. That said, since its inception more than a 
century ago international markets and practices have grown and 
evolved, and as such necessary reform to the Act was effected 
through the passing of the Insurance Act 2015 (UK). For Australia 
and other countries that largely or totally replicated the original UK 
statute in their domestic laws, significant flow-on effects must now be 
addressed if, indeed, the determination to remain in step with the UK 
is prioritised. Prior to reform of the UK Act, the principal brake upon 
this task was a desire to preserve consistency in a strongly 
connected and international market with an epicentre and legacy in 
London. Hence these changes have opened the door to reform 
without creating unnecessary disharmony or inconsistency in 
international practice. This article examines the law reforms in the 
UK, parallel reform considerations and options in Australia, and 
recommends a way forward.  
<DIV>INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) in their 2001 report entitled Review of the 
Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth)1 advocated numerous changes to the Marine Insurance 
Act 1909 (Cth) (MIA (Aust)); however, it stopped short of recommending the repeal of the 
Act and the inclusion of marine insurance within the scope of the Insurance Contracts Act 
1984 (Cth) (ICA (Aust)) for two principal reasons. First, the ALRC emphasised that as marine 
insurance is “an inherently international business, there is a strong call for Australian law 
and practice to be consistent with overseas”.2 Of particular importance in this context is 
the shared heritage with the UK. The MIA (Aust) is virtually identical to the Marine 
 
* Queensland University of Technology. 
1 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth), Report No 91 (2001). 
2 ALRC, n 1, [1.12]. 
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Insurance Act 1906 (UK) (MIA (UK))3 and London’s leading role in the world marine 
insurance market4 has led to a shared practice in use, development and construction of 
marine insurance contracts, as the report stated:  
<blockquote> 
The marine insurance market, long dominated by Lloyd’s and London, is still strongly 
influenced by UK law and practice. While there are other important insurance law regimes, 
such as the French and Scandinavian regimes, the London market and United Kingdom law 
have been the leading influence in the global marine insurance market. Australia has a close 
association with marine insurance law and practice in the United Kingdom and many other 
common law jurisdictions, including New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong 
and India, have legislation derived from the Marine Insurance Act (UK).5</blockquote> 
 Secondly, the ALRC recognised that the familiarity of insureds, insurers, brokers 
and other practitioners both within Australia and overseas with the basic structure of the 
MIA (Aust) warranted its retention as a separate scheme.6 
 Accordingly, the recommendations for reform in the ALRC report focused upon 
particular problems identified by the courts, policy-holders, law reform bodies in the UK, 
New Zealand and Canada, and the industry itself. Of particular relevance to this article are 
the reforms that were proposed to the duty of utmost good faith, the duty of disclosure 
and the law relating to warranties. These have not been acted upon to date (the result of 
“statutory inertia”7) due in particular to concerns about creating unnecessary disharmony 
or inconsistency with international practice in the marine insurance industry.8 
 However, the passage of the Insurance Act 2015 (UK) (IA (UK)), which commenced 
operation on 12 August 2016, has effected significant amendments to the MIA (UK) with 
potentially very important flow-on effects in those jurisdictions that replicated this marine 
 
3 As originally enacted. 
4 The most recent data for the marine insurance markets in Australia and the UK for the financial year ending 2014 show the 
totals for marine insurance premiums (hull, transport/cargo, marine liability and offshore energy) as follows: Australia 
US$353 million; UK (IUA) US$2,822,807 million; UK (Lloyds) US$6,551,871 million. See International Union of Maritime 
Insurance (IUMI); http://www.iumi.com/index.php/committees/facts-a-figures-committees/statistics. [AQ: check link] 
5 ALRC, n 1, [3.43]. 
6 Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Review of the Marine Insurance Act 1909, Discussion Paper No 63, [2.4]. 
7 I Davis, “Marine Insurance” (2001) 78 Australian Law Reform Commission Journal 45, 46. 
8 ALRC, n 1, [3.2]. It should be noted that the Insurance Laws Amendment Act 1998 (Cth) excluded pleasure craft from the 
operation of the Marine Insurance Act 1909 (Cth), instead bringing the insurance of such insurance under the umbrella of the 
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) and the consumer protection provisions of that Act. 
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legislation in their domestic legal systems, including Australia.9 It is contended in this article 
that these reforms in the UK open the door for similar amendments to the MIA (Aust) – not 
only is the brake of unnecessary disharmony or inconsistency removed, the converse is the 
case. Amendment to the MIA (Aust) is desirable and indeed necessary to update the 
legislation and to preserve harmonisation.  
 This article outlines the reforms in the UK and recommends parallel legislative 
change in Australia. One option would be to simply adjust the MIA (Aust) to align it with 
the MIA (UK) by replicating the amendments made by the IA (UK). Another option would 
be to recalibrate the MIA (Aust) to make it compatible with the non-marine general 
insurance regime ushered in by the ICA (Aust). In considering this issue the Maritime Law 
Association of Australia and New Zealand (MLAANZ)10 preferred the approach that more 
closely aligns the MIA (Aust) with the ICA (Aust), stating:  
<blockquote> 
… where there is already a well-established body of common law interpreting the provisions 
of the [ICA (Aust)] whereas interpretation of the [MIA (UK)] will involve uncharted waters as 
far as the English common law is concerned.11</blockquote>  
This author concurs with this view. 
<DIV>GOOD FAITH AND DISCLOSURE 
The IA (UK) amends s 17 and repeals ss 18-20 of the MIA (UK). Section 17 provides that 
insurance contracts are based upon utmost good faith and that “if utmost good faith be 
not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party”. The IA (UK) 
removes the remedy of avoidance of the contract for breach of the duty of good faith in s 
17 of the MIA (UK), and any equivalent common law rule.12 Section 17 is amended to 
simply state that a contract of marine insurance is one of utmost good faith. The 
Explanatory Notes to the legislation describe the intention of this amendment as follows: 
<blockquote> 
 
9 See, eg Marine Insurance Act 1908 (NZ); Marine Insurance Act 1993 (Canada); Marine Insurance Act 1963 (India); Application 
of English Law Act 1993 (Singapore); Civil Law Act 1957 s 5 (Malaysia). Latter two Acts apply Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) 
in Singapore and Malaysia respectively. 
10 Explanatory Memorandum for a Bill to amend the Commonwealth Marine Insurance Act 1909 (April 2016). 
11 Explanatory Memorandum, n 10, [9]. 
12 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 14. For an extensive review of the common law, see D Gultutan, “The Common Law Pre-
Contractual Duty of Disclosure and the Test of Materiality: Carter to Pan Atlantic – A Factual Analysis” (2015) 26 Insurance 
Law Journal 168. 
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[G]ood faith will remain an interpretative principle, with section 17 of the 1906 Act and the 
common law continuing to provide that insurance contracts are contracts of good 
faith.13</blockquote>  
 Merkin and Gurses14 suggest three possibilities flow from this, namely:  
<blockquote> 
First, section 17 may itself be elevated into the status of an Australian-style implied term, 
with damages for its breach … Secondly, section 17 may be used as the basis for implying 
specific terms into a contract of insurance, a step which the courts had begun to take even 
before the passing of the Insurance Act 2015. Thirdly, the courts might adopt entirely fresh 
remedies, for example, estoppel which precludes a party – typically the insurer- from 
relying upon a policy term or other right that might otherwise be open to that 
party.</blockquote> 
 It seems unlikely that the first of the possibilities suggested by these learned 
authors will be adopted. The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission15 were 
very clear that an entitlement to any claim for damages was a “step too far” and that the 
duty of good faith is an interpretative provision, the breach of which does not give rise to 
damages. In construing the IA (UK) and its provisions it is therefore likely that the courts 
will follow the ALRC’s view that the duty of good faith should be viewed as “a shield and 
not as a sword”16 – eg an insurer might on the basis of this implied good faith obligation be 
precluded from relying upon an exclusion clause to hide from the consequences of its own 
deliberate or reckless failure to pay a claim. 
 The IA (UK) effects further change to the MIA (UK) by repealing ss 18-20. These 
sections set out the pre-contractual duties of the insured and any agent to disclose 
material facts (defined as facts that would influence the judgment of a prudent 
underwriter), the duty upon an agent to disclose material facts known to the agent 
whether or not the insured was aware of them, and the insured’s duty not to misrepresent 
material facts. 
 Instead the IA (UK) introduces a “duty of fair presentation”, applicable to non-
consumer insurance contracts only, requiring an insured to disclose risk information to 
 
13 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015 (UK), [116]. 
14 R Merkin and O Gurses, “The Insurance Act 2015: Rebalancing the Interests of Insurer and Assured” [2015] 78 MLR 1004, 
1009. 
15 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Business Disclosure; Warranties; Insures 
Remedies for Fraudulent Claims; and Late Payment (Law Com No 353; Scottish Law Com No 238) (July 2014) [26.59]. 
16 The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission, n 15, [26.63]. 
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insurers before entering into an insurance contract.17 The obligation is to make a fair 
presentation of the risk, which is defined as one that:  
a) discloses every material circumstance the insured knows or ought to know, or, failing 
that, discloses to the insurer sufficient information to put a prudent insurer on notice 
that it needs to make further enquiries for the purpose of revealing those material 
circumstances;  
b) makes the disclosure in a manner that would be reasonably clear and accessible to a 
prudent insurer; and 
c) ensures every material representation as to a matter of fact is substantially correct.18  
In the absence of enquiry the insured is not required to disclose a circumstance if it 
diminishes the risk, the insurer knows it, the insurer ought to know it, the insurer is 
presumed to know it or it is something as to which the insurer waives information.19  
 The test of materiality is the objective test as to whether the circumstance or 
representation would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in determining whether 
to take the risk and, if so, on what terms.20 The IA (UK) provides examples of what may be 
material circumstances, namely: special or unusual facts relating to the risk; any particular 
concerns that led the insured to seek insurance cover for the risk; and anything those 
concerned with the class of insurance and field of activity in question would generally 
understand as being something that should be dealt with in a fair presentation of risks of 
the type in question.21 The requirement that disclosure be in a manner that is reasonably 
clear and accessible to a prudent insurer addresses a longstanding problem of data 
dumping whereby a broker or insured provides “a mass of information, often in CD form, 
which contains deeply buried material information”.22 
 Furthermore, the IA (UK) seeks to define the boundaries of what constitutes 
“knowledge” for purposes of disclosure of every material circumstance the insured knows 
or ought to know. Where the insured is an individual, such as a sole trader or practitioner, 
 
17 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 2. 
18 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 3. Note that a material representation is substantially correct if a prudent insurer would not 
consider the difference between what is represented and what is actually correct to be material (s 7(5)). 
19 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) ss 3(6), 5. 
20 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 7(3). 
21 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 7(4). See J Davey, “Utmost Good Faith, Freedom of contract and the Insurance Act 2015” (2016) 
27 Insurance Law Journal 247. 
22 Merkin and Gurses, n 14, 1011. 
Tarr 
©  6 (2017) ABLR 1 
that person will be taken to “know” anything that is known by an individual who is 
responsible for the insured’s insurance.23 Where the insured is not an individual, such as a 
company, certain individuals’ knowledge is directly attributed to the insured – in essence, 
the insured’s senior management or people responsible for the insured’s insurance.24 The 
insured, whether an individual or not, ought to know what should reasonably have been 
revealed by a reasonable search of information available to the insured, whether the 
search is conducted by making enquiries or by any other means.25 Finally, the Act also 
includes “blind eye knowledge”, which includes not only an individual’s actual knowledge 
but also matters the individual suspected and of which they would have had knowledge but 
for deliberately refraining from confirming or enquiring about such matters.26 
 Under the MIA (UK) the sole remedy for non-disclosure or misrepresentation was 
avoidance of the contract ab initio,27 subject to repayment of the premium in the absence 
of fraud.28 The pre-contractual duties enshrined in this legislation and the remedy of 
avoidance have consistently been held by the courts to apply to all forms of insurance on 
the grounds that it codifies the common law.29 Accordingly, under the MIA (UK) the insured 
was obliged to disclose every matter that would be material to the insurer’s decision to 
insure. Failure to do this permits the insurer to avoid the contract and refuse all claims 
under it, even where the insured person is not aware of what the insurer would consider 
material. The IA (UK) introduces a new system of proportionate remedies where the duty 
has been breached.30 Under the IA (UK), the insurer only has a remedy for breach of the 
duty of fair presentation if it can show that there is a “qualifying breach” – namely, the 
insurer must show that but for the breach it: (a) would not have entered into the contract 
 
23 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 4(2). 
24 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 4(3). Senior management means those individuals who play significant roles in the making of 
decisions about how the insured’s activities are to be managed or organised (s 8(c)) and persons caught under the umbrella 
of individuals responsible for the insured’s insurance include the insured’s employee or agent, the insured’s broker etc (s 
8(a)). 
25 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 4(6). Information in this context includes information held within the insured’s organisation and 
by any other person (such as the insured’s agent or a person for whom cover is provided by the contract of insurance (s 4(7)). 
“Carve outs” are provided in relation to certain confidential information (s 4(4)). 
26 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) ss 4(6), 6(1). See R Merkin, “What Does an Assured ‘Know’ for the Purpose of Pre-Contractual 
Disclosure?” (2016) 27 Insurance Law Journal 157. 
27 Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) ss 17-20. 
28 Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) ss 84(1). 
29 See, eg Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, 521. 
30 The approach adopted is similar to that adopted under the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 2012 
(UK), applicable to consumer contracts of insurance. 
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of insurance at all; or (b) would have done so only on different terms.31 If the breach is a 
qualifying breach and the inducement test is satisfied, the insurer may avoid the contract 
where it can prove the breach was deliberate or reckless, or where it can prove that the 
qualifying breach was such that it would not have entered the contract on any terms32 – 
hence there is a remedy of avoidance even in the absence of fraud or recklessness. For 
other breaches the remedy available to the insurer is dependent upon what the insurer 
would have done if the qualifying breach had not occurred, ie if the insured had made a fair 
presentation of the risk. For example, if the insurer would have charged a higher premium 
the insurer may reduce the claim proportionately.33 
 This approach closely parallels remedies available to the insurer for non-disclosure 
or misrepresentation under the ICA (Aust). In relation to general insurance in Australia,34 
the statutory remedies for non-disclosure and misrepresentation are not available to the 
insurer if “the insurer would have entered into the contract, for the same premium and on 
the same terms and conditions, even if the insured had not failed to comply with the duty 
of disclosure or had not made the misrepresentation”.35Accordingly there must be reliance 
by the particular insurer in relation to both misrepresentation and non-disclosure for 
remedies under the ICA (Aust) to be available. The insurer may avoid a contract of general 
insurance from the beginning if the non-disclosure or misrepresentation is fraudulent,36 
but avoidance is not available for innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation; instead, 
the liability of the insurer in respect of a claim is reduced to the amount that would place 
the insurer in the position it would have been had the non-disclosure or misrepresentation 
not occurred.37 For example, if the insurer would have issued the policy nevertheless but 
would have charged a higher premium then the insurer would be entitled to reduce the 
 
31 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 8(1). 
32 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 8, Sch 1. 
33 See Insurance Act 2015 (UK) Sch 1 Pt 2. 
34 The statutory remedies in relation to life insurance are largely the same – especially after the passage of the Insurance 
Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth). Again, where a failure to disclose or misrepresentation is fraudulent the insurer has an 
option to avoid the contract (s 29(1)), except in limited circumstances. Misstatements of age, even if fraudulent, do not result 
in the avoidance of a contract of life insurance – instead the sum insured or premium payable is adjusted in accordance with 
a formula provided in the Act and the adjustment has retrospective effect (s 30). A further refinement to this is introduced by 
the Insurance Contracts Amendment Act 2013 (Cth) whereby the insurer is given the option to change the expiration date to a 
date calculated on the basis of the correct date of birth, requiring neither the amount insured nor the premium to be 
modified (s 30(3A)). See also Insurance Contracts Amendment Regulation 2015 (No 1) (Cth). 
35 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 28(1). 
36 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 28(2). 
37 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 28(3). 
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claim by the amount of the additional premium; if the insurer would not have entered the 
contract at all, then it would be entitled to reduce its liability to zero.  
 The changes to the MIA (UK) are therefore in fairly close philosophical alignment 
with the position reached for non-marine insurance under the ICA (Aust). There are, of 
course, some fundamental differences: the test of materiality is the prudent insurer test 
and not the subjective insured test modified by objective considerations;38 there is no 
overarching “forgiveness” provision whereby the court may disregard avoidance;39 and 
subtle distinctions in the remedies and language deployed. But the broad similarities 
transcend the differences. For example, under the MIA (UK) the all-or-nothing remedy of 
avoidance for breach of the duty of utmost good faith is abandoned, opening the door to 
more graduated remedies commensurate with the breach, including damages. Further, the 
requirement that the insurer show that the breach in question would have impacted upon 
its decision to enter the contract of insurance at all, or on different terms, creates a 
threshold of inducement before any potential remedies come into play. 
 The amended MIA (UK) is also broadly congruent with the recommendations 
embodied in the ALRC’s report.40 The ALRC recommended that s 23 of the MIA (Aust) 
(equivalent provision to s 17 in the MIA (UK)) be amended to provide that there is implied 
in a contract of marine insurance a provision requiring each party to act towards the other 
party with utmost good faith in the terms of the ICA (Aust) ss 13 and 14. While the 
amendment to the MIA (UK) does not go as far as the ICA (Aust) provisions in implying an 
utmost good faith provision in the contract, this avenue is open to the courts in the UK.41 
The ALRC further recommended amendments to ss 24-26 of the MIA (Aust) (equivalent to 
ss 18-20 in the MIA (UK)). Rather than recommending the repeal of these sections, it put 
forward more moderate proposals – namely, ss 24(1) and 26(1) should be amended: (a) to 
provide that the insured should disclose accurately all circumstances that it knows, or a 
reasonable person in its circumstances would know, to be material; and (b) to delete the 
references to the insurer’s right to avoid and instead insert a new provision providing 
remedies for non-disclosure and misrepresentation.42 This new provision would entitle the 
insurer to avoid the policy and retain the premium where there is a fraudulent breach, 
otherwise a graduated set of remedies are recommended – eg if the insurer would not 
 
38 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 21(1)(b). 
39 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 31. 
40 ALRC, n 1. 
41 Merkin and Gurses, n 14, 1009, cite the example of Gan Insurance Co Ltd v Tai Ping Insurance Co Ltd (No 2) [2001] Lloyd’s 
Rep IR 667, where such implication has already occurred prior to the reform of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK). 
42 ALRC, n 1, 230-232, Recommendations 20-25. 
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have entered the contract at all if the undisclosed circumstance had been disclosed 
avoidance of the policy from the outset is available; if the insurer would have entered the 
contract but on different terms, the insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured for a loss 
proximately caused by the undisclosed or misrepresented circumstance. The scope of s 25 
is curtailed to provide that an agent must disclose all circumstances that it knows, or a 
reasonable person in its position would know to be material, but does not extend to 
disclosure of information that ought to have been communicated to the agent. 
 There is little doubt that the ALRC in recommending the more moderate reform of 
ss 23-26 of the MIA (Aust) was strongly influenced by a desire to preserve uniformity in 
international marine insurance law and practice, or at least to introduce only incremental 
change.43 The amendments to the MIA (UK) pave the way for a more robust law reform 
agenda. Accordingly, in relation to utmost good faith, non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation, it is recommended that s 23 of the MIA (Aust) be amended to provide 
that there is implied in a contract of marine insurance a provision requiring each party to 
act towards the other party with utmost good faith in the terms of the ICA (Aust) ss 13 and 
14. This is in line with the ALRC’s recommendation. Further, it is suggested that ss 24-26 
should be repealed. In lieu of those sections governing disclosure and misrepresentation, it 
is recommended that the equivalent sections in the ICA (Aust)44 be extended to apply to 
contracts of marine insurance. The merits of such an approach are twofold: (a) there will be 
internal consistency in Australian law in both marine and non-marine contracts of 
insurance in regards to the law and remedies applicable to non-disclosure and 
misrepresentation; and (b) this change will be in close alignment with the position in the 
UK – while differences in detail will exist, the general intent of the legislative reforms and 
the graduated remedies applicable to breaches will be consistent. Furthermore, this will 
extinguish the distinction introduced when the insurance of pleasure craft were excluded 
from the operation of the MIA (Aust) and included under the ICA (Aust).45 Finally, it is 
suggested that extension of the operation of the ICA (Aust) and its disclosure regime to all 
Australian insurance contracts is to be preferred over an approach that sees another 
variant or hybrid of the disclosure regime developed. 
<DIV>PRE-CONTRACT REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES 
 
43 ALRC, n 1, [10.92]. 
44 Namely, Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) ss 21, 23, 26, 27, 28. 
45 See Insurance Laws Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). The ALRC suggested that “small fishing or other commercial vessels could 
be included under the ICA, as was done with pleasure craft”: ALRC, n 6, [2.29]. 
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The IA (UK) abolishes “basis of the contract” clauses, which have the effect of converting pre-
contractual information supplied to insurers into warranties.46 Commonly “basis of contract” 
clauses are declarations on an insurance proposal form or policy stating that the insured 
warrants the accuracy of the answers or that the answers form the basis of the contract. This 
effectively turns the insured’s representation into a warranty.47 In the absence of this 
legislative intervention, the insurer would be discharged from liability for all claims if a 
misrepresentation was made, even if the misrepresentation was immaterial and did not 
induce the insurer to enter the contract.48 
 Section 10 of the IA (UK) also abolishes any rule of law whereby a breach of a 
warranty (express or implied) in an insurance contract discharges the insurer from liability 
completely from that point onwards, even if the breach is remedied.49 Instead a breach of 
warranty now suspends rather than entirely discharges the insurer’s liability until the 
breach is remedied. The insurer will be able to rely upon the warranty to avoid liability for 
any claim arising during this period of suspension, but once the breach is remedied the 
policy resumes in full force.50 The Act also prevents an insurer from denying liability on the 
basis of breach of warranty where:  
a) because of a change of circumstances, the warranty ceases to be applicable to the 
circumstances of the contract; or  
b) compliance with the warranty is rendered unlawful by any subsequent law; or  
c) the insurer waives the breach of warranty.51  
 
46 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 9. The Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations Act 2012 (UK) s 6 abolishes the basis 
of the contract clauses in consumer contracts. 
47 See, eg Dawsons Ltd v Bonnin [1922] 2 AC 413; Genesis Housing Association Ltd v Liberty Syndicate Management Ltd [2013] 
EWCA Civ 1173. 
48 See Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015 (UK). 
49 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 10(1). See, eg B Soyer, “Warranties in Commercial Insurance Contracts – Is the Time Ripe for a 
Reconsideration of Their Contractual Status?” (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 168. 
50 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 10(2). 
51 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 10(3). Section 10(7) repeals the second sentence of s 33(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
(UK), which provided that a promissory warranty is “a condition which must be exactly complied with, whether it be material 
to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, the insurer is discharged 
from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any liability incurred by him before that 
date”. The emphasised sentence is omitted to accommodate the suspensory reform introduced by s 10 of the Insurance Act 
2015 (UK). Further s 10(7) repeals s 34 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) and substitutes s 10(3) as to when a breach of 
warranty does not apply.  
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Merkin and Gurses52 describe the “suspensory solution” as a “neat one”, but s 10 of the Act 
does not impose a causation test, thereby requiring the breach to be causative of the loss.  
 This is the preserve of s 11 of the Act, which provides that if a loss occurs, and an 
express or implied term of the contract of insurance has not been complied with, the 
insurer may not rely on the non-compliance to exclude, limit or discharge its liability under 
the contract for the loss if the insured shows that the non-compliance with the term could 
not have increased the risk of the loss that actually occurred in the circumstances.53 The 
Explanatory Notes to the IA (UK)54 give the example of a property damaged by flooding 
where an insured could successfully invoke the protection of this section if the contractual 
breach involved a failure to use a required type of lock on a window that could not have 
increased the risk of that loss. In this case the insurer would be obliged to pay out the flood 
claim. This section does not apply to a term defining the risk as a whole, but does apply to 
any term compliance with which would tend to reduce the risk of loss of a particular kind 
or loss at a particular location or loss at a particular time.55 
 Section 10 of the IA (UK) and s 54(2) of the ICA (Aust) have a lot in common as both 
sections are directed at curing commonly identified mischiefs. The resemblance though 
should not be overstated as IA (UK) has steered away from the particular structure and 
detail of the ICA (Aust) provision. Section 54 of the ICA (Aust) was enacted on the strong 
recommendation of the ALRC,56 which sought to introduce the dual brakes of causation 
and proportionality to a wide range of conduct or omissions that could impact upon 
insurance claims. The wording of the section requires that a distinction is drawn between 
acts that did or were reasonably capable of causing or contributing to the loss, and those 
that did not or could not contribute to the loss claimed by the insured. The scope of the 
Australian legislation is more broadly cast than the IA (UK) provision but a common intent 
is clearly evident. Pursuant to s 54, where the conduct of the insured or some other person 
 
52 Merkin and Gurses, n 14, 1019. 
53 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 11(2), (3). 
54 Explanatory Notes to the Insurance Act 2015 (UK), [95]. 
55 Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 11(1). Z Jing, “Warranties and Doctrine of Alteration of Risk During the Insurance Period: A Critical 
Evaluation of the UK Law Commissions’ Proposals for Reform of the Law of Warranties” (2014) 25 Insurance Law Journal 183 
provides a well-argued evaluation of this reform of the law of warranties, arguing that these reforms are insufficient to 
mitigate the harshness and unfairness of remedies for breach of warranty, suggesting that the remedies in the doctrine of 
alteration of risk would be fairer. See also B Soyer, “Risk Control Clauses in Insurance Law: Law Reform and the Future” (2016) 
75 Cambridge Law Journal 63, which elaborates upon these reforms from a risk assessment and management perspective. 
See also A McGee, “Alteration of Risk in Insurance Law” (2013) 24 Insurance Law Journal 139. 
56 See Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), Insurance Contracts, Report No 20 (1982) [228]. See also M Ball, “Reducing 
Claims under the Insurance Contracts Act 1984” (1992) 5 Insolv LJ 1, 4-25; J-A Tarr, “Controlling Insurance Contract Terms: 
Section 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act” (2014) 42 ABLR 317. 
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could not have been caused or contributed to the loss, the particular claim is allowed save 
that the insurer’s liability “in respect of the claim is reduced by the amount that fairly 
represents the extent to which the insurer’s interests were prejudiced as a result of that 
act”.57 Thus, the insurer is required to provide an indemnity assessed by reference to 
ordinary contractual principles offset by the deduction of an amount that reflects the 
insurer’s loss calculated in accordance with the principle of proportionality.58 Conversely, 
where an act or omission of an insured or of some other person is within the scope of a 
contractual term and is potentially causative of any loss in respect of which insurance cover 
is provided by the contract, prima facie the insurer may refuse to pay the claim. 
Notwithstanding that the act or omission is causative or potentially so, if the insured 
proves that no part of the loss was caused by the insured’s act or omission then the insurer 
cannot refuse to pay the claim.59 For example, if an intoxicated person has a personal 
injury policy excluding liability if the insured suffers injury “whilst intoxicated” and injury 
occurs when, through no fault on their own part, the insured is injured in a motor vehicle 
accident while a passenger in a vehicle driven by another, this is quite distinct from a 
situation where the insured drives dangerously while intoxicated and injures themself, in 
which case the intoxication clearly is causative of the injury.60 Similarly if the insured 
proves that there was no causation as to some part of the loss, the insurer may not refuse 
to pay that part of the claim.61  
 The ALRC in reviewing the law of warranties in marine insurance recommended the 
abolition of the concept of warranties, both express and implied: 
<blockquote> 
[I]n the place of express warranties, the Commission proposes a regime under which the 
insurer has a number of structured remedies available to it should there be a breach of any 
express term of the contract by the insured. The Commission also recommends that the 
implied warranties of seaworthiness and legality be removed. However, the Act should 
specifically permit contracts of marine insurance to include express terms relating to 
seaworthiness of a ship and in relation to legality of purpose of the insured voyage and 
manner in which it is carried out. In order to obtain the protection that is currently available 
to them under the Marine Insurance Act … insurers should be required to reword their 
 
57 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 54(1). 
58 See ALRC, n 56, [228]; see also Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 (NZ) s 9. 
59 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 54(3). 
60 See Sampson v Gold Star Insurance Co Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 742 (SC), 746 (Barker J), discussing Insurance Law Reform Act 1977 
(NZ) s 11, which controls non-causative exemptions. 
61 Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) s 54(4). 
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documentation so that all terms upon which they wish to rely appear on the face of the 
contract.62</blockquote> 
 The ALRC emphasised that the principal criticism with the operation of warranties 
is that any breach, however trivial or unrelated to the loss, entitles an insurer to be relieved 
of any liability under the policy from the date of the breach. It instead proposed that the 
insurer be discharged from all liability to indemnify an insured for any loss that was 
proximately caused by breach of an express term. This would not, in the ALRC’s view, affect 
the policy as a whole, which “otherwise remains on foot”.63 Further, it would be possible 
for an insured to remedy any breach of a contractual term before any loss. In relation to 
the proposed express term relating to seaworthiness, the ALRC recommended the same 
approach as for any other express term save that they advocate a lesser or “looser”64 
causal connection between the unseaworthiness of the vessel and the loss – namely, the 
insurer is not liable to indemnify the insured for loss that is “attributable” to the breach. 
Finally, in relation to voyage carried out for an illegal purpose, the ALRC recommended, as 
a matter of public policy, that the insurer should be relieved of all liability under a contract 
of marine insurance. Conversely, where the breach is relatively minor (the ALRC refers to a 
“slight technical breach of regulation”) the result would be that the insurer is only relieved 
of liability to indemnify the insured for any loss attributable to the breach.65 
 The IA (UK) by repealing the second limb of s 33(3) of the MIA (UK) abolishes any 
rule of law whereby a breach of a warranty (express or implied) in an insurance contract 
discharges the insurer from liability completely from that point onwards, even if the breach 
is remedied. Instead a breach of warranty now suspends rather than entirely discharges 
the insurer’s liability until the breach is remedied.66 As discussed above, the operation of 
warranties is further controlled by s 11 of the IA (UK), which provides that if a loss occurs, 
and an express or implied term of the contract of insurance has not been complied with, 
the insurer may not rely on the non-compliance to exclude, limit or discharge its liability 
under the contract for the loss if the insured shows that the non-compliance with the term 
could not have increased the risk of the loss that actually occurred in the circumstances. 
The insurance law reform agenda in the UK would, it is respectfully suggested, benefit from 
a further review of the scope of s 11 of the IA (UK). This provision would be more effective 
if its scope were broadened, as in s 54(2) of the ICA (Aust), to encompass within its 
 
62 ALRC, n 1, [1.18]-[1.19]. 
63 ALRC, n 1, [1.22]. 
64 ALRC, n 1, [1.20]. 
65 ALRC, n 1, [1.21]. 
66 The “suspensory” solution in Insurance Act 2015 (UK) s 10. 
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operation acts and/or omissions in relation to non-risk provisions.67 Nevertheless, 
as Merkin and Gurses surmise,68 this provision in addressing the unacceptable state of the 
present law will prove to be most controversial. 
 From an Australian perspective it is recommended that the legislature consider an 
identical amendment to s 39(3) of the MIA (Aust) (the equivalent provision to s 33(3) of the 
MIA (UK)) and the extension of s 54 of the ICA (Aust) to all contracts of marine insurance. 
This will keep Australian and UK marine insurance law and practice closely aligned, and 
remedy the particular mischiefs associated with strict compliance with warranties. The 
ALRC’s approach to abandon the concept of warranties, as opposed to tempering their 
application, is not favoured. The principal reason for this opposition is that it will introduce 
an unnecessary divergence in approach and run counter to international harmonisation of 
this global business. 
<DIV>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The insurance law reform initiatives in the UK have made significant changes to the MIA 
(UK). In particular: the truncation of s 17 to the statement that a contract of marine 
insurance is one of the utmost good faith; the repeal of ss 18 (disclosure by assured), 19 
(disclosure by agent effecting insurance), 20 (representations pending negotiation of 
contract) and 34 (when breach of warranty is excused); and the amendment of s 33 (nature 
of warranty) by the omission of the second sentence in s 33(3).69  
 Given that the changes wrought to the MIA (UK) are of considerable practical 
importance and impact, it is recommended that the Australian legislature consider parallel 
amendments to the local version of this Act. Ensuring legal uniformity across this area of 
contracting would be commercially desirable. As the MLAANZ observed: 
<blockquote> 
Once the MIA (UK) comes into force … the MIA (Aust) will be in the invidious position of 
retaining provisions over a century old which have now been discarded in mother 
legislation in the UK. As the MIA (UK) adopts a more pro-assured approach it would seem 
 
67 Generally, see recent discussion in Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd v Matthew Mitchell [2013] WASCA 115; Prepaid Services Pty 
Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV (2013) 302 ALR 732. 
68 Merkin and Gurses, n 14, 1020. 
69 Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) s 33(3) provided that a promissory warranty is “a condition which must be exactly complied 
with, whether it be material to the risk or not. If it be not so complied with, then, subject to any express provision in the policy, 
the insurer is discharged from liability as from the date of the breach of warranty, but without prejudice to any liability 
incurred by him before that date”. The emphasised sentence is omitted to accommodate the suspensory reform introduced 
by s 10 of the Insurance Act 2015 (UK). 
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probable that this will place the Australian marine insurance market at a competitive 
disadvantage and at real risk of losing business.70</blockquote> 
 If this course was adopted, some amendment to the ICA (Aust) would be required. 
The ICA (Aust) does not apply across the board to contracts and proposed contracts 
covered by the MIA (Aust), so a reform of the MIA (Aust) to align it with the UK Act would 
require the adoption of disclosure and warranty provisions to “plug” the holes. These are 
recommended in the text above.  
 In general, it is interesting to note that the insurance law reforms introduced in the 
UK and in Australia effect significant changes to the law and practice of insurance in both 
jurisdictions. The thrust, if not the detail, of these reforms demonstrate a common purpose 
and a similarity in response in addressing the various issues and problems. Overall, these 
reforms achieve their objective to modernise the law and to alleviate or eliminate 
problems identified by the courts, policy-holders, law reform bodies and the industry itself. 
Further refinements to the MIA (Aust) and to the marine insurance laws of other 
jurisdictions sharing this common heritage71 will enhance uniformity in an increasingly 
interconnected world and strengthen causation and proportionality requirements in 






70 Explanatory Memorandum for a Bill to amend the Commonwealth Marine Insurance Act 1909 (April 2016) [6]. Note – as the 
Insurance Act 2015 (UK) commenced on 12 August 2016 this statutory misalignment is in effect. 
71 See A Costabel, “UK Insurance Act 2015: A Restatement of Marine Insurance Law” (2015) 27 St Thomas Law Review 133, 
which discusses the divergences but, more recently, convergences in the law and practice of marine insurance law in the US 
and the UK. 
